When it comes to economic reforms in developing countries, many economists agree on broad objectives (such as fostering outward orientation). Broad objectives, however, can be pursued in many di¤erent ways, and policy experimentation is often indispensable for learning which alternative works locally. We propose a simple model to study this societal learning process. The model explores the role of disagreeing beliefs about "what works".
Introduction
There is little disagreement when it comes to the broad objectives of important economic reforms in developing countries. Many economists think that growth rates in poor places can be improved by strengthening the security of property rights, market-oriented incentives, and outward orientation. However, as ever, the devil lies in the detail. A particular objective can be approached in many di¤erent ways. For instance, as highlighted by Rodrik (2008) , outward orientation can be promoted through import liberalization, by paying export subsidies, or by establishing export-processing zones. What is more, the nature of the "most appropriate" reform policy is often highly context-speci…c, i.e., depends on the existing institutional framework (e.g., Commission on Growth and Development, 2008; Rodrik, 2010) . For instance, export subsidies might be the appropriate choice if the …nancial system fails to funnel credit to the most competitive …rms (while, under these circumstances, a policy of rapid import liberalization might be ine¤ective or even harmful for total factor productivity). On the other hand, import liberalization might be the successful approach if credit markets manage to allocate capital quite e¢ ciently (while, in such a situation, the introduction of an export-subsidy scheme might have little or even a negative overall impact on productivity).
The contextual nature of the policy-reform process entails that there is often substantial ambiguity as to which reform measures work and which ones are more likely to be ine¤ective or even harmful. 1 Clearly, this ambiguity also fosters disagreement about appropriate reform plans (Rodrik, 2010) . From the point of view of an impartial "planner", policy experimentation is often instrumental for learning about what works and what does not. 2 However, as a matter of fact, people, policy makers, and experts alike often hold strong and opposing opinions about appropriate reforms (Rodrik, 2010) . This can interfere with a society's propensity to experiment. The more some segments of society are convinced that a particular reform proposal is misguided anyway, the more inclined they will be to spend resources to block the approval or implementation of that reform. As a result, there may be little experimentation and little learning about which speci…c reform measures work. In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical model to systematically explore the consequences of disagreeing beliefs for policy experimentation, societal learning, and economic development. 1 This ambiguity is re ‡ected in a statement by Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore who initiated sweeping economic reforms. He writes: "I started out with great trepidation on a journey along an unmarked road to an unknown destination." (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008, p. 29.) 2 Some scholars (e.g., Heilmann, 2008; Rodrik, 2010; Xu, 2011) argue that policy experimentation played a crucial role in China's economic rise. Similarly, many successful East Asian countries (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan) tried out unconventional and tailor-made trade policies to integrate with the world economy.
It has been common among economists to relate disagreement about alternative reform policies to con ‡icts of interest. However, Saint-Paul (2010) forcefully argues that this provides an incomplete account of reality:
In most situations the reform process is associated with a debate and the debate is about what the economic e¤ects of the reform are and how the mechanisms underlying those e¤ects work. People disagree not only because their net gains di¤er but also because they have a di¤erent understanding of how the reform works.
This aspect is typically neglected in our analysis which assumes that all agents use a single, objective model -the correct model of the economy -to compute their gains and losses. If this were true, there would not need to be a debate. But in real-world situations the reform is heavily discussed because there is disagreement on how it will work. (p. 325)
The literature has established several sources of such genuine disagreement. Sethi and Yildiz (2012) , for instance, show that persistent disagreement arises in fragmented or segregated societies where individuals do not observe other individuals'priors or where they only observe the priors of individuals within their own social group. Suen (2004) shows that there can even be a rationally induced demand for information from like-minded sources. Psychological explanations of disagreement highlight the role of overcon…dence and that people tend to estimate the precision of their own beliefs higher than of others' beliefs (e.g., Alpert and Rai¤a, 1982; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Andreoni and Mylovanov, 2012) . 3 In this paper, we take the existence of initial disagreement as given. We do assume, however, that people learn accurately from reform experiences so that disagreement may weaken over time.
In our model, there are two political actors, an incumbent and an opposition. The incumbent is in control of the executive and may propose a speci…c reform policy. This reform policy is implemented unless the opposition puts in its veto, in which case the inherited default policy remains in force. Vetoing a proposed policy is costly, and we take the magnitude of this cost as a measure of the executive's strength. The incumbent can choose among two alternative reforms. One alternative is successful, whereas the other one is harmful. From the perspective 3 Interestingly, Rodrik (2010) himself alludes to psychological factors behind disagreeing beliefs: "Researchers and academics ... have to resist the temptation to substitute prepackaged solutions for nuance and skepticism.
The record suggests they have not always been very good at this. Despite their scienti…c demeanor, economists are subject to the same cognitive biases as others: overcon…dence, tendency to join the herd, and proclivity to overlook contradictory evidence. As a consequence, too often they become associated with (and promoters of) universal blueprints only loosely grounded in theory and evidence." (p. 40) 3 of an impartial observer, there is a high degree of uncertainty about which is the successful one. However, the political actors hold non-neutral and disagreeing prior beliefs in this regard, implying that each group perceives the other group's favorite reform as harmful. The implementation of any of these two reforms, and the subsequent observation of the aggregate output, allows the two actors to update their beliefs. However, uncertainty is not completely eliminated because the economy is subject to confounding exogenous shocks.
We show that in such an environment the reform process may come to a complete standstill.
This can happen even though everybody knows that a Pareto-improving reform does exist. To see why, consider the situation of the opposition. The opposition believes that the reform favored by the incumbent is harmful and hence certainly costly in the short term. Moroever, from the opposition's perspective, the incumbent will update its belief about what works only insu¢ ciently after the implementation of its proposal. Speci…cally, after observing the output, the incumbent may stick to the initial policy even if -in the opposition's view -the news is not good and would mandate a reversal of the reform. This low propensity to revisit past reforms is anticipated by the opposition. It may therefore expect a negative overall payo¤ from experimentation and hence incur the cost of a veto to save the status quo.
Such a "gridlock equilibrium" leads to economic stagnation and emerges whenever exogenous shocks are su¢ ciently big and the executive is su¢ ciently weak. The model therefore o¤ers a new perspective on the lack of sustained growth in parts of the developing world, where it is common that economies are exposed to big exogenous shocks (because they specialize in volatile sectors -see, e.g., Koren and Tenreyro, 2007) and where executives tend to be weak (because of low bureaucratic capacity -see, e.g., Rauch and Evans, 2000) . Our model further predicts that a higher degree of disagreement reduces economic growth. Using data on political attitudes from the World Value Survey, we document the existence of such a negative correlation in a cross-section of 58 developing and emerging economies.
Although the importance of the experimental approach to development policy has been advocated for a while (e.g., North, 1990; Roland, 2000; Mukand and Rodrik, 2005) , there is relatively little theoretical work on societal learning through experimentation. Majumdar and Mukand (2004) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some evidence on disagreement and economic growth. Section 3 introduces the basic model. In Section 4, we solve the model and discuss the factors determining whether an "experimentation" or a "gridlock" equilibrium emerges. Section 5 focuses on growth and Section 6 concludes.
Motivating Evidence
How does disagreement about key economic reforms relate to long-run economic performance?
This section presents some motivating evidence in this regard. Relying on a cross section of 58 developing and emerging economies, we document a remarkably strong negative correlation between disagreement and economic growth in the 1980-2009 period.
Following Lindqvist and Östling (2010), our measure of disagreeing beliefs is based on four attitude questions from the World Value Survey. The four questions investigate people's broad attitudes towards income inequality, the role of the government, and economic competition.
More speci…cally, people are confronted with four polar statements (which are listed in Table   1 , Panel A) and then asked how much they agree or disagree with each of these statements (on a 1-10 scale). To obtain a proxy for disagreeing beliefs at the country level, we calculate the standard deviations of the answers separately for each of the four questions, using as many 4 Somewhat relatedly, the literature on institutional design (e.g., Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, 2004) investigates the optimal degree of insulation of a leader, i.e., the share of votes that can block a leader when he tries to implement legislation. This literature, however, is not concerned with societal learning. , and a standard index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 5 We focus on countries that are not among founding members of the OECD. For 58 of these countries (listed in Table 1 , Panel B), the required data is available.
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The main empirical pattern is presented in Figure 1 . The …gure shows a partial regression plot, illustrating a negative correlation between average annual GDP p.c. growth (residuals) and disagreement about economic policies. 6 The estimated coe¢ cient on disagreement (which is the slope of the …tted line in the …gure) is 0:016 (p-value: 0:053), implying that an increase in disagreement from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with a fall in annual GDP p.c. growth of 1:29 percentage points. This is a sizable correlation, considering the fact that the 90th-to-10th-percentile di¤erence in the annual growth rate is just 3:96 percentage points.
The correlation between the two variables is also quite robust: Its magnitude is unchanged when we leave out the Gini index, or the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or both; at the same time, the estimate turns signi…cant at the 1%-level in all these cases.
Figure 1 here
Obviously, we cannot draw strong conclusions from Figure 1 . Our data is purely crosssectional and the proxy for disagreeing beliefs is relatively indirect. However, the …gure does call attention to the fact that there is a robust negative relationship between economic growth and disagreement about key economic policies in a cross-section of poorer economies. We …nd this negative relationship although we control for income inequality and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The theory we develop below o¤ers an explanation for this correlation. 5 The data on GDP p.c. and income inequality comes from the World Development Indicators. We consider a two-period economy that is populated by a continuum of individuals of mass one. There are two groups of individuals that di¤er in their beliefs regarding the impact of alternative economic policies (as is discussed below), but are identical in all other dimensions.
The groups are dubbed left and right, and are indexed by L and R.
Each individual derives utility from consumption of the single (non-storable) output good that is produced in the economy. Overall utility is given by
where x i;t refers to consumption of a representative member of group i 2 fL; Rg in period t 2 f0; 1g and > 0 re ‡ects the importance of second-period consumption.
All individuals have access to a uniform technology which generates a period income of
units of the output good. In the above equation, A is the non-random part of the period income; a 2 f ; g stands for an unobserved binary random variable that materializes before the economy starts and remains constant over time; t refers to the economic policy implemented in period t; t represents an exogenous shock which is independent of a and distributed according to a standard normal distribution; 0 is a constant that scales the variance of the disturbance term. 7 Since none of our results depends on A, we normalize it to zero, such that
At the end of each period, all individuals observe Y t but neither a nor t . The ex ante probability of a = is denoted by p. As we will discuss below, the two groups, L and R;
hold disagreeing beliefs about the value of p.
Policies and the Political Process
Policies. There are three di¤erent policy options, t 2 f 1; 0; 1g: The middle option, 0, represents the inherited "default policy" in period 0, whereas both 1 and 1 are "reform policies". We refer to policy 1 as the left reform policy, and to policy 1 as the right reform policy (without any political connotation). Clearly, whether or not a given reform (i.e., a deviation from the default policy) improves or impairs economic performance depends on the unobserved realization of a 2 f ; g. For instance, if a were equal to , option 1 would represent a successful reform while the alternative would be a failure.
In practice, governments concerned with reforms are often confronted with such situations.
For instance, as discussed in the introduction, a government concerned with outward orientation might have to choose between import liberalization and export subsidies without exactly knowing which of the two measures is the appropriate one under local circumstances. Another example would be the reform of credit-market institutions. Suppose that a developing-country government has to choose between investing in contract-enforcement institutions (i.e., the court system) or in information institutions (i.e., credit registries). This is not an obvious choice because, according to the huge literature on …nancial imperfections (see, e.g., Banerjee and Du ‡o, 2010, for an overview), the nature of the successful reform is likely to depend on the importance of relationship lending, a variable that is hard to observe. If relationship lending were rather unimportant, the …rst option would be likely to improve matters a lot (while the bene…ts from investing in credit registries might not cover the costs). However, if relationship lending were important, investing in credit registries would be the optimal choice (while investing in law-enforcement institutions might even be harmful).
Political process. In the beginning, "nature" determines which of the two groups is in control of the executive over the entire two periods. 8 We refer to this group as the incumbent, while the other group is called the opposition. The incumbent proposes a speci…c policy where D t 2 f 1; 0; 1g stands for the "default policy" and v t 2 f0; 1g refers to the decision on the "veto", with 1 indicating that the proposed policy is blocked. Regarding the default policy,
we have D 0 = 0. Furthermore, today's policy choice is tomorrow's default policy:
Blocking a reform is costly. For the opposition, a veto is associated with expenses of c t 0 units of output. In what follows, we take this cost to re ‡ect the incumbent's executive strength: If a veto is expensive, the incumbent is strong because it takes much e¤ort to prevent a proposed policy from taking e¤ect, and vice versa.
In practice, the strength of the executive depends on many factors, both fundamental and time-varying. Executive strength is surely a¤ected by a country's political institutions. The executive is relatively weak if it is constrained by a powerful system of checks and balances that allows the opposition to delay, dilute, or veto a proposed policy at little e¤ort. 9 In contrast, if formal checks and balances are weak, the executive is strong since blocking a proposed policy tends to involve coslty measures such as organizing strikes or stirring up demonstrations. A further important determinant of executive strength is the capacity of the bureaucracy to implement formally adopted policies. If this capacity is low (e.g., because of ine¤ective oversight of bureaucrats or lacking human resources), the executive is weak as opposition groups might be able to "throw o¤ course" the implementation of policies at little e¤ort (e.g., by paying modest bribes to key o¢ cials). 10 In contrast, if bureaucratic capacity is high, inducing key o¢ cials not to comply with reform directives tends to be costly.
Finally, next to these fundamental factors, executive strength may be a¤ected by the history of economic reforms. In practice, reversing a recently implemented reform is a complex endeavor that, among other things, requires a disproportionate e¤ort from the part of the bureaucracy. It is therefore natural to assume that it is comparatively easy to make the bureaucracy undermine a reversal of a previous reform. In our model, this means c 1 < c 0 if 0 6 = 0 (and c 1 = c 0 otherwise). More speci…cally, throughout the paper, we assume c 0 = c 0 and
This assumption captures in a simple way the notion that executive strength is reduced if a reversal is attempted. At the same time, focusing on this limiting case simpli…es the derivation of the equilibrium. However, as discussed in Appendix B, the model generates similar implications if past reforms do not weaken the executive (and hence c 1 = c 0 in all cases). 9 In the related literature, capturing checks and balances through the presence of veto powers is a usual approach (see, e.g., Diermeier and Myerson, 1999) . In practice, systems of checks and balances often involve judicial review of executive/legislative acts or a legislature that consists of two chambers; or that needs to pass important laws with a supermajority; or that may amend policy proposals by the executive. 1 0 Political scientists (e.g., Huber and McCarty, 2004) have identi…ed low bureaucratic capacity, and the associated susceptibility for corruption, as a major obstacle to the implementation of reforms. 9 
Beliefs about Reforms
A key assumption in our model is that there is disagreement between groups L and R about the appropriate reform policy. In formal terms, we assume that the groups have heterogeneous priors about p. Members of group L believe that p is equal to p L > 1=2, while members of group R think that p = p R < 1=2. As a result, group L believes that reform policy left is more promising than policy right (whereas the opposite holds for group R). Note further that our assumptions imply that a priori each group perceives the other group's favorite reform proposal as harmful. While we take the existence of disagreeing prior beliefs as given, we assume that people learn from public information according to Bayes'rule.
Although we do not model the emergence of disagreeing beliefs, it is natural to think that they stem from di¤erent exposures to schools of thought or foreign reform experiences. For instance, returning to the example of credit-market reform discussed above, people who were trained that information matters for lending might selectively look at examples of successful introductions of credit registries abroad -and hence may develop a strong belief that these institutions are also key to success at home. On the other hand, people concerned with contract enforcement might focus their attention on successful examples of judicial reforms -and hence get convinced that such reforms are also instrumental to success at home.
Timing of the Political Game
The timing of the political game is as follows.
Period 0:
-Nature determines a (unobserved) and the identity of the incumbent (L or R).
-The incumbent proposes a policy 0 .
-The opposition decides whether or not to veto the proposal, i.e., chooses v 0 .
-Nature determines Y 0 ; and all agents update their beliefs.
Period 1:
-The incumbent proposes a policy 1 .
-The opposition decides whether or not to veto the proposal, i.e., chooses v 1 .
-Nature determines Y 1 .
The information structure in this game is such that both groups perfectly know each others' preferences and beliefs, and also observe each others'actions. The only uncertainty concerns nature which determines the underlying state of the world a 2 f ; g and the disturbance terms 0 ; 1 . However, since nature is not a strategic player, the above game is de facto a dynamic game with complete information. Therefore, it can simply be solved by backward induction. We require players to have beliefs that are consistent with Bayes' law and to correctly anticipate each others'posterior beliefs.
Solving the Political Game
In this section, we solve the political game by means of backward induction. Without loss of generality, we henceforth assume that group L is chosen to be the incumbent. Note that -since p R < 1=2 -the above condition requires both 1 = 1 and
Group L's policy proposal 1 is determined as follows. Since the group still prefers reform policy left, it opts for 1 = 1 (although this option is only weakly preferred if a veto is anticipated). Thus, to summarize, if 0 = D 1 = 0, we have 
where f ( j a = ; 0 ) denotes the density function of the normally distributed random variable Y 0 j a= ; 0 and f ( j a = ; 0 ) refers to the density function of Y 0 j a= ; 0 : To save on notation, we henceforth stick to the following notation:
Policy left implemented in t = 0. If group L was able to implement its preferred policy
Given this, and taking into account the functional form of the standard normal density, group i's posterior belief i; 1 can be written as
Assuming that agents maximize expected utility, it follows from (1) that it is crucial for group i's attitude towards 1 whether or not i; 1 is greater than 1=2. If this is the case, the group would like to stick to the implemented reform policy left; otherwise, it would prefer policy right. It is straightforward to check that i; 1 1=2 is equivalent to
which, in turn, can be rearranged to obtain
Note that Y i; 1 is decreasing in p i so that Y L; 1 < Y R; 1 : Hence, the more optimistic a group's initial view on reform policy left is, the lower the realized level of output must be in order to make the group prefer the alternative reform policy in t = 1. Moreover, a higher degree of exogenous variation in the output variable (relative to the impact of a policy change, ) ampli…es the absolute di¤erence between the two thresholds.
Consider now group R's decision problem. It follows from (2) 
A necessary condition for a veto is thus that a policy change is proposed (i.e., 1 6 = 1).
Obviously, if there is no attempt to change policy, a veto does not have any e¤ect and hence is not used. Moreover, there can only be a veto if R; 1 > 1=2; i.e., if group R's belief of the probability of a = is greater than 1=2 (instead of lower, according to the initial belief).
This, in turn, requires Y 0 Y R; 1 :
We now turn to group L's choice of 1 . As discussed above, the group wants to revise its will not be a veto since it would be without any e¤ect. To summarize, we have
Policy right implemented in t = 0. Assume now that the policy implemented in t = 0 was the one preferred by group R (i.e, 0 = D 1 = 1). Then, we have Y 0 j a= ; 0=1 N ; 2 :
Using the functional form of the standard normal density in equation (7), and following an approach similar to the one above, we can …nd a condition for i;+1 1=2:
A posterior belief i;+1 greater than 1=2 implies again that group i prefers policy left over policy right. However, since policy right was implemented in t = 0, i;+1 1=2 means this time that group i prefers to change policy (from right to left) rather than to stick to it. Note that Y i;+1 is increasing in p i so that Y L;+1 > Y R;+1 : Hence, the more optimistic a group's initial view on reform option left is, the higher the realized level of output must be in order to convince the group that option right has been the appropriate choice.
Group R's expected second-period consumption is given by [ R;+1 ( ) + (1 R;+1 ) ] 1 if it does not use its veto; otherwise, in the case of a veto, expected second-period consumption is simply [ R;+1 ( ) + (1 R;+1 ) ]: As a result, we observe a veto if and only if
As above, it is immediately clear that a veto will only be used if policies are proposed to change (i.e., 1 6 = 1). Moreover, consistent with group R's initial belief, R;+1 must be less than 1=2
-which, in turn, requires Y 0 > Y R; 1 :
the group proposes to change policy from right to left (i.e., 1 = 1), a decision that will be vetoed later on by group
; the incumbent sticks to policy right (i.e., 1 = 1), a decision that does not trigger a veto because group R agrees (and, in any case, a veto would be ine¤ective). To summarize, we have
First Period 4.2.1 Decision on the Veto
Regarding group R's decision on v 0 , it is immediately clear that neither 0 = 0 nor 0 = 1 would trigger a veto. Vetoing these proposals would either be useless or against the group's own interest. However, if 0 = 1, group R may want to block the proposed policy.
Opposition' s payo¤ from policy left. The decisive factor for group R's decision on whether or not to veto policy left is the expected payo¤ under its belief p = p R . Suppose that group R does not use its veto. Then, taking into account the impact of today's decision on choices tomorrow (equation 9), group R's expected overall utility is
where the last term in (12) re ‡ects group R's valuation of policy experimentation and
Note that R; 1 would take the simple form ( = ) ( = ) if we had neutral and hence agreeing beliefs (i.e., p L = p R = 1=2), where denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Clearly, in that case, R; 1 would be strictly positive, re ‡ecting the value of experimentation in a world with neutral priors. However, even then, R; 1 would converge to zero as the variance of the exogenous shock goes to in…nity: If is large, Y 0 is a very noisy signal about a so that the expected payo¤ from experimentation is small. For the case of non-neutral and disagreeing beliefs, we have the following results:
Proposition 1 Group R's valuation of experimentation with reform policy left is given by R; 1 ; where R; 1 is (i) striclty decreasing in the variance of the exogenous shock, falling from 1 to 2p R 1 < 0 as rises from 0 to in…nity; (ii) and striclty decreasing in the degree of disagreement (i.e., it decreases as p L rises or p R falls).
Proof. See Appendix A.
As in the case of neutral beliefs, a higher variance of the exogenous shock lowers the value of experimentation because Y 0 becomes a less informative signal. However, with non-neutral and disagreeing priors, group R's valuation of policy experimentation decreases even more strongly.
Group R anticipates that, the higher the variance of the shock, the less likely it will be that group L would ever revise its view about the appropriate reform (see equation 8).
A similar intuition explains the impact of stronger disagreement. The higher p L , the less likely it becomes that group L will revise its view (see equation 8, again) and switch to policy right, i.e., to the policy group R thinks is appropriate ex ante. In addition, group R's perceived value of experimentation decreases as p R falls. The lower p R , the higher the expected damage associated with sticking to the -from group R 's perspective -inappropriate policy left.
Decision on vetoing policy left. Having established group R's payo¤ from policy experimentation, we can now determine under which circumstances policy left will be vetoed.
Expected utility associated with v 0 = 0 is given by equation (12) . On the other hand, if v 0 = 1, tomorrow's equilibrium decisions are characterized by equation (6) because there is no change to the default policy (i.e., D 1 = 0). In this case, expected utility can be expressed as
For further use below, we establish the following result:
Lemma 1 If opposition group R (weakly) prefers to veto reform policy left in t = 0, the group will strictly prefer to use its veto against left in t = 1.
Obviously, if policy left is vetoed in t = 0, when there is still a possible future payo¤ from experimentation, the adoption of left must be prevented in the …nal period as well.
To describe the parameter constellation under which a veto against left arises, we de…ne a function e R (c), which, for given beliefs p L and p R , assigns to each c a value of such that
In other words, if = e R (c), group R is indi¤erent regarding the use of its veto in t = 0.
Lemma 2 below characterizes the shape of the e (c)-function.
Lemma 2
The function e R (c) has the shape as shown in Figure 2a: , i.e., it is strictly increasing from zero to in…nity on the interval [(1 2p
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Decision on Policy
We now move on to the last step, the determination of the policy proposal by group L. Since p L > 1=2, the group prefers reform policy left. It is thus immediately clear that 0 = 1 if this proposal will not be vetoed by group R. The situation is more involved, however, if group R is set to veto policy left. In this case, group L considers its expected utility under the alternative reform option: Because policy right would not be blocked, opting for 0 = 1 would permit experimentation and learning. Therefore, and in particular if p L is close to 1=2 (i.e., if group L is "centrist"), group L may prefer policy right over political gridlock.
To …nd out, we have to derive E L f U L j 0 = 1g : Taking into account the impact of today's decision on equilibrium choices tomorrow (equation 11), we obtain
where L;+1 is de…ned by equation (20) Proposition 2 Group L's valuation of experimentation with reform policy right is given by L;+1 ; where L;+1 is (i) striclty decreasing in the variance of the exogenous shock, falling from 1 to 1 2p L < 0 as rises from 0 to in…nity; (ii) and striclty decreasing in the degree of disagreement (i.e., it decreases as p L rises or p R falls).
In anticipation of a veto against policy left, group L proposes right if E L f U L j 0 = 1g is greater than zero, the overall utility associated with 0 2 f 1; 0g; which follows from Lemma 1 and equation (6) . Otherwise, the group opts for policy left (although this policy choice is only Assuming that 1 2p L + > 0 holds, Figure 2b : illustrates for which (c; ) combinations group L prefers to propose policy right (below the e L line) rather than to opt for policy left. (c; ) combinations giving rise to a "gridlock equilibrium" from combinations leading to an "experimentation equilibrium". 11 In the gridlock equilibrium (area above the solid line), group L proposes policy left in t = 0, a choice that is vetoed by group R. In formal terms, we have 0 = 1 and v 0 = 1: Moreover, it follows from Lemma 1 and equation (6) that these choices are repeated in t = 1. Hence, in the gridlock equilibrium, reform attempts are repeatedly blocked, the default policy is in force in both periods, and learning is absent.
Equilibrium and Discussion

Figure 3 here
The situation is di¤erent in the experimentation equilibrium (area below the solid line). In t = 0, group L proposes either policy left (below the solid and the dashed lines) or policy right (between the solid and the dashed lines). In both cases, the group's decision is not vetoed later on (i.e., we have either ( 0 ; v 0 ) = ( 1; 0) or ( 0 ; v 0 ) = (1; 0)). Because a reform policy is in fact implemented, agents are able to update their beliefs after observing Y 0 . As a result, the initial policy decision may be revised in t = 1. Decisions in this latter period are given by equation (9) if 0 = 1 and by equation (11) if 0 = 1. Figure 3 can also be used to characterize the circumstances under which the gridlock equilibrium may arise. Note …rst that the asymptote of the e R -curve coincides with the y-axis if p R is equal to 1=2 (while the asymptote lies strictly to the right of the y-axis if p R < 1=2). Hence, the gridlock equilibrium cannot exist in the limiting case p R = 1=2. Regarding e L ; observe that equation (16) and Proposition 2 imply
(while this limit is strictly less than 0 if p L > 1=2). Hence, in the limiting case p L = 1=2; we have e L ! 1 so that, once again, the gridlock equilibrium cannot exist. However, except for the cases in which (at least) one of the groups has neutral beliefs, Figure 3 shows that there always exist (c; ) combinations which give rise to the gridlock equilibrium. Figure 4 here Figure 4 , …nally, illustrates the situation for di¤erent degrees of disagreement. In Figure 4a ., both p L and p R are relatively close to 1=2 ("mild"disagreement). So e L takes a comparatively high value and the asymptote of the e R -curve is close to the y-axis. As a result, the set of (c; ) combinations giving rise to the gridlock equilibrium is small. In Figure 4b :, p L and p R are closer to the polar values 1 and 0, respectively ("strong" disagreement). The "gridlock area" is therefore comparatively large. To summarize, we have the following results:
Proposition 3 Assuming non-neutral and disagreeing beliefs (i.e., p L > 1=2 and p R < 1=2), there are two types of equilibria: Experimentation and gridlock. Whenever: c is su¢ ciently low and is su¢ ciently high (area above the solid line in Figure 3) , the gridlock equilibrium emerges. This is an equilibrium in which the proposed reform policy is vetoed in both periods and, as a result, agents are unable to learn; c is su¢ ciently high and is su¢ ciently low (area below the solid line in Figure 3) , the experimentation equilibrium emerges. This is an equilibrium in which a reform policy is adopted in t = 0 and, after the updating of beliefs, potentially revised in t = 1.
A higher degree of disagreement (i.e., a higher value of p L or a lower value of p R ) is associated with a larger "gridlock area".
Proof. See the text above.
The main point of Proposition 3 is that disagreeing beliefs, through their impact on the political process, can lead to a paradoxical situation: Although everyone knows that a Paretoimproving reform does exist, decisions are taken that prevent the implementation of any reform.
The consequence is that the economy is stuck in an "bad"equilibrium with sub-optimal policies 18 and a persistently strong disagreement. In other words, disagreeing beliefs undermine the very societal learning process that would narrow down disagreement over time.
Disagreement is bad for policy experimentation for two related reasons. First, from the perspective of the opposition, the reform option the incumbent wants to try …rst is the wrong one and hence expected to impose a short-term loss. Second, the opposition anticipates that the incumbent may stick the wrong policy even if -in the view of the opposition -a low realization of Y 0 mandated a reversal of the reform. Because of this low propensity to revisit an earlier decision, the opposition expects a low (or even negative) long-run payo¤ from experimentation, i.e., a payo¤ that may not cover the short-term loss. As a result, the opposition may be willing to spend resources on securing the status quo. A symmetric argument explains why the incumbent is reluctant to experiment with the opposition's preferred policy option.
Disagreement and Economic Growth
We now characterize expected output growth and explore how it is a¤ected by the primitives of the model. We do so from an impartial and ex ante point of view. This requires taking a stance on the appropriate belief about p, i.e., the belief adopted by an impartial rational agent.
Impartial Rational Beliefs
As noted earlier, achieving broad policy goals (like outward orientation or a more e¢ cient allocation of credit) requires di¤erent measures in di¤erent countries. Whether a certain reform policy works in a particular country is often highly context-speci…c. Extrapolating from the experiences of other countries is therefore di¢ cult and implementing reforms often means setting out for the unknown. We capture this prototypical situation by assuming that the parameter p is objectively unknown in the sense that the success probability of either of the two reform alternatives cannot be reliably judged based on existing evidence.
Treating p as an objectively unknown parameter requires us to specify how an impartial rational agent would come up with a prior belief regarding p. Following the principle of indi¤erence (which goes back to Bayes and Laplace), we assume that an impartial rational agent would adopt a ‡at prior and treat p as being uniformly distributed over the range [0; 1]. 12 It is straightforward to show that this is equivalent to assuming p = 1=2. An important implication of taking a stance on the appropriate belief is that prior beliefs deviating from p = 1=2 are to be seen as biased (e.g., as a result of overcon…dence, as discussed above).
Economic Growth
We now turn to output growth as expected by an impartial rational agent at the beginning of period 0. The expectation operator E in the analysis below is thus to be understood from an ex-ante perspective and with respect to the impartial belief p = 1=2 (rather than p L or p R ).
Expected growth. From equation (2) Using the de…nitions z i ln(p i =(1 p i )) =(2 ); i 2 fL; Rg; we obtain
if reform policy left is implemented in t = 0; and
if reform policy right is implemented in t = 0, where ( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
The fact that expected output growth is strictly positive mirrors that experimentation leads
to learning about what type of reform policies work. While in t = 0 policy makers are "right" in only one half of the cases, the success probability is greater than 1=2 in t = 1.
Determinants of expected growth. How is expected output growth a¤ected by the primitives of the model? Our analysis suggests two basic correlations. First, assuming non-neutral beliefs, it predicts lower growth rates (on average) in economies that combine big exogenous shocks with low executive strength: If takes a su¢ ciently high, and c a su¢ ciently low value, the gridlock equilibrium prevails (Proposition 3), in which case expected output growth is zero; otherwise, experimentation takes place, which implies positive growth in expectations (Proposition 4). An immediate corollary of this prediction is that developing or emerging economies are less likely to experience learning-driven growth: There is strong evidence that poorer countries are exposed to big exogenous shocks (e.g., Loayza, Rancière, Servén, and Ventura, 2007), not least because they specialize in volatile sectors (e.g., Koren and Tenreyro, 2007) ; at the same time, executives in poorer countries tend to be weak in the sense that low-capacity bureaucracies make it easy for dissenting groups to "throw o¤ course" the implementation of We further identify the extent of disagreement as an important determinant of the political equilibrium. In economies that combine high exogenous volatility and low executive strength, the gridlock equilibrium emerges whenever the extent of disagreement among the political actors is su¢ ciently high. As a result, our model suggests that stronger disagreement reduces an economy's growth prospects. It is interesting to observe that a negative correlations between GDP growth and a measure of disagreement (about key economic policies) can indeed be found in a cross-section of developing and emerging economies -even when controlling for the potentially confounding e¤ects of heterogeneity in income or culture. (6) describes the equilibrium choices made in t = 1. Since v 1 is assumed to be 0; equation (6) im-
i.e., the condition that must hold if v 0 = 1 is weakly preferred to v 0 = 0: Using equations (12) and (14), and the fact that (1 2p R ) c, this condition turns into
Using the de…nition of R; 1 given in equation (13), the above inequality can be rewritten as
Note that the right-hand side of the above condition must be strictly positive since Figure 2 . Finally, note that
where d R; 1 =d < 0 (Proposition 1). Hence, we have de =dc > 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. L;+1 is given by
To establish the properties of L;+1 , one can follow the approach taken in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Observing that a takes the two possible values and with equal probability, an alternative way of writing EfY 1 Y 0 g = Efa 1 g is
Consider …rst a parameter constellation that leads to the adoption of policy left in t = 0. In this case, according to equation (9), we have
As a result, the conditional expectations of 1 are given by, respectively,
and
Inserting these two expressions into equation (21), and rearranging terms, yields
From this, we can derive equation (17) by observing Suppose now that the parameter constellation leads to the adoption of policy right in t = 0.
Then, according to equation (11), we have 1 = 1 if Y 0 Y R;+1 and 1 = 1 otherwise. As a result, the conditional expectations of 1 are given by, respectively,
By inserting these two expressions into equation (21) , and by following a similar series of steps as above, one obtains equation (18) . EfY 1 Y 0 g is again strictly positive because = > 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose …rst that the parameter constellation gives rise to an experimentation equilibrium with policy left implemented in t = 0. Then, expected output growth is given by equation (17), and we obtain
where denotes the standard normal density. Since is symmetric around zero, we have
Still assuming that policy left is implemented in t = 0, we further obtain
Observe that the …rst term in square brackets (which is negative) is greater in absolute value than the second term in square brackets (which may be negative or positive). Given this, and
Finally, if the parameter constellation gives rise to an experimentation equilibrium with reform policy right implemented in t = 0, expected output growth is given by equation (18) .
The signs of the partial derivatives in this case can be established in a similar way.
Appendix B
As pointed out in Section 3, this appendix characterizes the equilibrium that emerges if the cost of a veto does not depend on the history of economic reforms. More precisely, in this appendix, we assume that the cost of a veto in t = 1 is no longer given by equation ( Note …rst that group R's expected overall utility associated with ( 0 ; v 0 ) = ( 1; 0), given by equation (12) , is una¤ected by this modi…cation (and so is Proposition 1). The reason is that, independent of the value of c 1 , group R never uses its veto in t = 1 if policy left is implemented in t = 0. Hence, in this case, the expected overall utility cannot depend on the cost of a veto in t = 1: Note further that group R's expected overall utility associated with ( 0 ; v 0 ) = ( 1; 1), given by equation (14), is also una¤ected (and so is Lemma 1): Because of the veto against policy left, no reform is implemented in t = 0; hence, in this alternative case, equation (5) implies that c 1 = c 0 = c; as is assumed here. As a result, the function e R (c), which is described in Lemma 2 and illustrated in Figure 2a: , is unchanged.
While Figure 2a : is una¤ected by the modi…cation considered in this appendix, Figure 2b: is not. The reason is that we have a change to group L's expected overall utility associated with implementing policy right in t = 0. More speci…cally, one can show that
30 where L;+1 denotes group L's valuation of policy experimentation in this modi…ed setup.
One can further show that L;+1 is increasing in c if c < c; and una¤ected by c if c c, where
The positive relationship at lower levels of c is due to the fact that the range of Y 0 -observations that make group R veto a proposed policy change in t = 1 narrows down as c increases.
Put di¤erently, a higher cost of a veto means that group L is more often in a position to implement its preferred policy in t = 1; a fact that is re ‡ected in a higher valuation of policy experimentation. However, if the cost of a veto is su¢ ciently high (i.e., if c exceeds c), group R will never use its veto in t = 1 so that c does no longer a¤ect L;+1 .
Figure 5 here
The fact that E L f U L j 0 = 1g is no longer independent of c has consequences for the e Lline shown in Figure 2b : Speci…cally, e L (i.e., the level of below which group L chooses right Note: Panel A shows the four attitude questions from the World Value Survey (WVS) on which our proxy for disagreement is based. WVS asks respondents how much they agree or disagree with each of these four polar statements, using a 1-10 scale. We calculate the standard deviation of these answers separately for each question and then use the average standard deviation (across the four questions) as a proxy for disagreement. Panel B lists the 58 developing and emerging economies (i.e., countries that are not among the founding members of the OECD) which are included in our data. 
